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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
gle of the federal courts to reconcile the rule with requisite independence
towards doubtful or undecided questions is manifest. To quote Professor
Corbin, "If it [Erie R. R. v. Tompkins] is an admonition to federal judges
that there is no 'federal general common law' that is to be found solely in
the opinions of other federal judges, much is thereby gained. But if it is a
direction to substitute an omnipresence brooding over Pennsylvania alone,
in place of the roe-like bird whose wings have been believed to overspread
forty-eight states, something has indeed been lost.
' 22
C. A.
REAL PROPERTY-ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY-HOMESTEAD RIGHTS IN Two
PERSONS IN THE SAME FAMILY-[Missouri].-In a recent Missouri case'
land was held in an estate by the entirety. After the death of the husband
a judgment in favor of plaintiff on a joint note executed by the man and
wife subsequent to acquisition of the land was sought to be levied thereon.
Held, that the wife under Missouri statutes2 acquired a right of homestead
and exemptions upon the filing of the deed to herself and husband, and
that the husband having failed to claim such exemptions, she might do so
after his death.
This case emphasizes a peculiar interpretation of the Homestead Stat-
utes' and the Married Woman's Act4 when construed together. Under the
Homestead Act alone,5 before the Married Woman's Statute,( the wife could
never claim an exemption unless the husband died, absconded, or absented
himself from his usual place of abode.7 She could never claim it when
the husband was alive and present regardless of whether the title to the
property was in the husband, wife, or jointly in both.8 But when the
husband died leaving a widow or minor children, the homestead right
descended to them and this was not made conditional upon the husband's
having failed to claim. 9 Under the Married Woman's Act 10 the wife may
22. Note, The Common Law of the United States (1938) 47 Yale L. J.
1351, 1353.
1. Ahmann v. Kemper (Mo. 1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 256.
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 608, 615, 2998.
3. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608.
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
5. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608 provides in part that "The homestead of
every housekeeper or head of a family, consisting of a dwelling house and
appurtenances, and the land used in connection therewith * * * [shall] be
exempt from attachment and execution."
6. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
7. Gladney v. Berkley (1898) 75 Mo. App. 98; White v. Smith (1904)
104 Mo. App. 199. 78 S. W. 51.
8. Martin v. Barnett (1911) 158 Mo. App. 375, 138 S. W. 538.
9. Armor v. Lewis (1913) 252 Mo. 568, 161 S. W. 251.
10. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998, after stating that a married woman shall
be deemed a femrme sole, provides that "a married woman may invoke all
exemption and homestead laws now in force for the protection of personal
and real property owned by the head of a family, except in cases where
the husband has claimed such exemption for the protection of his own
property." See also Luster v. Cook (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 459.
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invoke all exemptions in force for the head of a family except where the
husband has made such claim for the protection of his own property."1
This right in the wife is limited to property owned by the wife and does
not include that owned by the husband.1 2 Construed with the homestead
statute the Married Woman's Act' 3 is regarded as an enabling statute
removing the disability of the wife to claim exemptions in her own property
while the husband is alive and refuses to claim, and she may still, under
the Homestead Law,14 claim exemptions in her husband's property when
he dies or absconds. 15 Another Missouri statute G provides that the home-
stead right is created and vests upon the date of filing of the deed for
record.17
The peculiarity arises when these statutes, as interpreted by Missouri
courts, are applied to an estate by the entirety. It is well settled in Mis-
souri that such estates have not been changed by the Married Woman's
Act'8 but have remained as they were at common law.'9 Each spouse owns
all the property and the estate is one whole, indivisible unit, vested in one
person with a dual body and personality.20 When one spouse dies, the sur-
11. Martin v. Barnett (1911) 158 Mo. App. 375, 138 S. W. 538; State
ex rel. Schwettman v. Oberheide (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 395.
12. White v. Smith (1904) 104 Mo. App. 199, 78 S. W. 51.
13. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
14. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608.
15. In Gladney v. Berkley (1898) 75 Mo. App. 98, the court held that
under the Homestead Act there could be but one homestead right which
must be exercised by the husband because so long as the marriage relation
exists, he is regarded the head of the family. But the husband having
absconded, the wife could claim. In Smith v. White (1904) 104 Mo. App.
199, 78 S. W. 51, the court, with reference to the opinion in Gladney v.
Berkley, said: "The homestead in question belonged to the husband and
the court's decision had reference to property of that situs only. It could
not be held to apply to a case where the property in question belonged to
the wife because it would clearly be against the very letter of said section
4335 [R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 4335, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998]. * * * the
language of the act is that 'a married woman may invoke all exemption
and homestead laws, notwithstanding the husband may be head of the
family'." Martin v. Barnett (1911) 158 Mo. App. 375, 138 S. W. 538,
holds that the wife can claim exemption "under section 2185, R. S. 1909
[R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608] only when the husband has absconded or ab-
sented himself from his usual place of abode in this state; under section
8304 [R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998] only when the husband has failed to
make his claim." See also Bank of Liberal v. Redlinger (1902) 95 Mo.
App. 279, 68 S. W. 1073; Luster v. Cook (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 459.
16. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 615 reads in part as follows: "Such homestead
shall be subject to attachment and levy of execution upon all causes of
action existing at the time of acquiring such homestead, * * * and for this
purpose such time shall be the date of the filing in the proper office for
the record of deeds, the deed to such homestead * *."
17. See in this connection Sharp v. Stewart (1904) 185 Mo. 518, 84
S. W. 963; Balance v. Gordon (1912) 247 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. 358; McCluer
v. Virden (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 70 Fed. (2d) 724.
18. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
19. Frost v. Frost (1906) 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527, 118 Am. St. Rep.
689; Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy (1918) 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. IV.
67, L. R. A. 1918C 1009.
20. See 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 182, where during a discussion of
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vivor simply keeps what he or she had before.21 There is no increase in
the estate, and the change is in the person rather than in the estate.22
Therefore the holding that the widow received a right of homestead at
the time of the filing of the deed seems correct.23 If this be carried to its
logical conclusion, it would seem that there may be two persons in the
family who have a vested right to claim exemptions: (1) the husband as
head of the family under the Homestead Act 24 and (2) the wife by reason
of the Married Woman's statute.25 But it has been repeatedly held that
as between husband and wife there can be only one right of homestead,
and that right must be asserted in the name of the husband because so
long as the marriage relation exists de jure, he must be regarded the head
of the family.26
In the instant case the court correctly solves the problem by holding
that while the right vests in both spouses, its exercise by one precludes
exercise by the other. 27  W.J.H.
TORTS-AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE-STATUS OF PERSON WHO CON-
TRIBUTES TOWARD TRAVELING EXPENSES-[Texas].-A Texas statute' re-
quires proof of ordinary negligence in the case of a passenger for hire and
gross negligence in the case of a guest, defining the latter as one who rides
in another's car "without payment." In a recent decision 2 the Court of
the incidents of joint estates the author says, "and therefore, if an estate
in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither properly joint
tenants nor tenants in common; for husband and wife being considered as
one person in law they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are
seized of the entirety, per tout et non per my." See also Goldberg Plumbing
Supply Co. v. Taylor (1922) 209 Mo. App. 98, 237 S. W. 900.
21. Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh (1918) 273 M'o. 353, 201 S. W. 72.
22. Garner v. Jones (1873) 52 Mo. 68; Rezabek v. Rezabek (1916) 196
Mo. 673, 192 S. W. 107; Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1932) 329 Mo. 207,
44 S. W. (2d) 115; In re Staiger's Estate (1929) 104 N. J. Eq. 149, 144
Atl. 619; In re Dell's Estate (1935) 154 Misc. 216, 276 N. Y. S. 960;
Newsome v. Shackleford (1931) 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S. W. (2d) 384.
23. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 615.
24. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608.
25. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
26. Gladney v. Berkley (1898) 75 Mo. App. 98; Martin v. Barnett (1911)
158 Mo. App. 375, 138 S. W. 538.
27. In Morrow v. Zane (1914) 185 Mo. App. 111, 170 S. W. 918, the
Springfield Court of Appeals held however that the wife had in effect
two estates: (1) her own by the entirety which was acquired prior to the
incurring of the debt and in which she therefore could claim homestead;
(2) her husband's estate by the entirety which was acquired by his deed
conveying his interest to her subsequent to the incurring of the debt and
in which she therefore could not claim homestead. The court apparently
bases its conclusion upon the idea that at common law estates by the
entirety were divisible because the husband had right to possession and
usufruct of such lands during marriage and his interest was vendible. But
see Hall v. Stephens (1877) 65 Mo. 670, 27 Am. Rep. 302; National Bank
of Plattsburg v. Fry (1902) 168 Mo. 492, 68 S. W. 348, and the authorities
cited in notes 13, 14, 15, and 16, supra.
1. Tex. Vernon's Stat. (1936) c. 225, art. 6701b.
2. Raub v. Rowe (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 190.
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